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| author | tanaka takashi <isazaka@gmail.com> | 2026-08-13 18:20:33 +0900 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | tanaka takashi <isazaka@gmail.com> | 2026-08-13 18:20:33 +0900 |
| commit | 76fdcb43585a4c4d288c1026d318a0ddbe3e26ab (patch) | |
| tree | f58296832d37b035d3e787e0f270c77b59c89d77 /README.md | |
| parent | 78fe349073e3a2e89f0bf14b134ae0955aa7182a (diff) | |
fix(sandbox): correct cmd descendant handling and protected ACL policy
Replace the earlier cmd-wide descendant incompatibility diagnosis with the verified distinction between drive-qualified paths and PATH/workspace-relative invocation. Document the cmd YAML configuration, executable resolution, --no-runtime approval flow, and safe descendant invocation examples in the user README.
Keep the System32 protected DACL intact for both the OS Runtime Root and approved entry files nested below it. Skip redundant file-level ACL rewrites for approved System32 executables while retaining LPAC confinement, resolved-path checks, SHA-256 approval, WFP policy, and Job Object enforcement.
Expand Windows coverage with capability positive/negative matrices, protected-DACL regression tests, cmd/PowerShell/venv Python script execution, nine Entry-to-Descendant combinations, network none/local probes, and randomized ACL round-trip testing. Add read-only CLI/README verification and published HTTP MCP agent_run verification scripts.
Update Design, Audit Report, and Requirement Traceability with the corrected root cause, current evidence, withdrawn diagnostic conclusions, and the remaining partial item for per-combination descendant self-recorded LPAC SID/Job evidence.
Verified: Release build 0 warnings/errors; Core 103 PASS; Planner 10 PASS; Windows 75 PASS with skip 0; README operational suite 19 PASS; published HTTP MCP agent_run completed 3/3 with cmd, curl, C:\tmp\.venv Python, network-none enforcement, ACL restoration, and CMD_HTTP_MCP_OK.
Diffstat (limited to 'README.md')
| -rw-r--r-- | README.md | 35 |
1 files changed, 35 insertions, 0 deletions
@@ -173,6 +173,41 @@ Mountの`access`には`read_only`、`read_write`、`read_write_delete`を指定ã 承認は最初にBrokerが直接起動するEntry Processにだけ適用されます。Entry Processから生成される子孫Processには個別承認を要求しませんが、同じLPAC、ACL、WFP、Job Objectの制限を継承します。未知の外部ExecutableやMount上のExecutableは、Brokerから直接起動できません。 +#### cmd.exeを有効にする例 + +`agent.local.yaml`のShell一覧へAliasを追加します。配列はlocal側で置換されるため、ほかのShellも使う場合はすべて列挙してください。 + +```yaml +sandbox: + profile: development + workspaces: + - C:/tmp + execution: + executables: + - python + shells: + - cmd +``` + +管理者として起動したPowerShellで、cmdの実体を確認して承認します。cmdはWindowsのOS Runtime Rootを利用するため、追加Runtime Rootを登録しない`--no-runtime`を指定します。 + +```powershell +cd <install-dir> +.\agent-mcp.exe executable resolve cmd ` + --path C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe ` + --config .\agent.yaml +.\agent-mcp.exe executable approve cmd ` + --path C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe ` + --no-runtime ` + --config .\agent.yaml +.\agent-mcp.exe executable list --config .\agent.yaml +.\agent-mcp.exe check --config .\agent.yaml --lang ja +``` + +非対話で承認する場合だけ`approve`へ`--yes`を付けます。この操作はAuditへ記録されます。 + +cmdから子Processを呼ぶ場合は、`cmd.exe`、`curl.exe`、`.venv\Scripts\python.exe`のようにPATHで解決できる名前またはWorkspace相対パスを使います。`%ComSpec%`や`%SystemRoot%\System32\curl.exe`のようなドライブ修飾絶対パスは、cmd自身が事前にvolume情報へアクセスするため、LPACではOSに拒否されることがあります。これは子Process生成の禁止ではありません。 + ### Network | `access` | 許可内容 | |
