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authortanaka takashi <isazaka@gmail.com>2026-09-02 03:14:05 +0900
committertanaka takashi <isazaka@gmail.com>2026-09-02 03:14:05 +0900
commit82bb55f66071b452e3bc7adeb09eafb5003de11f (patch)
tree01d48a68273594fc2ed480d837724562dd6fb05d /doc/Security.md
parentf5439335e1d18ee577e2b7c1e67f7844f9f235ac (diff)
feat: PDF Viewer translation via context menu and two-mode Action Popupv0.1.0
Add Firefox built-in PDF Viewer support using only public WebExtensions APIs: a selection context menu ("選択したテキストを翻訳") starts a translation and the toolbar Action Popup shows the streaming result. No content-script injection into the privileged PDF Viewer, no PDF.js internals, no separate windows, no custom viewer (Specifications.md §4.6). Specification alignment (Phase 1) - Specifications.md: new requirements PDF-01..04 (PDF selection translation), CTX-01..03 (context menu translation), POP-01..06 (popup two modes); SEL-06 updated to route PDF through the menus API; section 13.4 adds a 14-item manual PDF verification checklist; section 15 removes "Firefox内蔵PDF Viewerへの対応" from out-of-scope - Design.md: architecture diagram with the menus path, menu-translation component, menus permission, popup translation-result state machine (idle/starting/streaming/completed/error/cancelled), shared translation state (§9.2), context-menu integration phase, test plan and API audit checklist items (menus permission scope, no PDF Viewer internals) - Security.md: menus permission restricted to selection-context translation; PDF Viewer treated as privileged browser UI (no injection, no wrappedJSObject/cloneInto/exportFunction, no internal DOM access); menus.OnClickData.selectionText treated as untrusted input passing the same validation pipeline; popup result rendering stays textContent-only Background (Phase 2) - translation-service.js (new): the single translation pipeline shared by every entry point - selection validation (type/trim/empty/control chars/max length), prompt building, Ollama request, session/abort, and the shared translation state (requestId, sourceText, translatedText, status, model, error, startedAt, source). "source" is metadata only; a PDF-specific translation engine does not exist - menu-translation.js (new): validates menus.OnClickData.selectionText and starts a sink-less translation observed via GET_POPUP_STATE - message-router.js: routes port translations through the shared service; new runtime messages GET_POPUP_STATE and REGENERATE_LAST; popup-state port handler broadcasts live state (initial push + every chunk/status change) so an open popup shows streaming progress in real time - index.js: registers the selection context menu (contexts: ["selection"] only, no menus.onShown) and calls browser.action.openPopup() synchronously inside the click user gesture, catching failures so a popup-open problem never breaks the translation itself - manifest.json: permissions now ["storage", "menus"] - settings-service.js: __resetCacheForTests hook for test isolation Popup two-mode UI (Phase 3) - popup.html/js/css: mode nav (設定 / 翻訳). Translation mode shows status, model, streaming text (textContent only), user-safe error, and copy (Clipboard API only, no execCommand fallback), regenerate (new requestId reusing the stored source text) and a settings shortcut. Closing the popup never cancels the request; reopening shows the latest text and continues receiving chunks live. Initial mode: active (starting/streaming) translation wins, otherwise the last tab the user picked is restored (storage.local.popupMode, default settings) Fresh-install model auto-selection - translation-service.js ensureModelConfigured(): when storage.model is empty, pick the first model from the running Ollama and persist it before translating, mirroring the popup/options auto-select. A user who never opened any settings UI can translate immediately; when Ollama is unreachable a clear OLLAMA_UNAVAILABLE message is shown User-safe error details - detailForUser(): strips URLs (no internal host names echoed to the UI), caps length at 120 chars, drops full JSON response bodies, and hides meaningless low-level network errors so the popover/popup shows the base message plus at most a short, safe detail Tests: 85 passed, 0 failed - selectionText validation (untrusted input pipeline) - menu selection -> translation -> popup state streaming/completed - empty selection rejected without starting a request - streaming status transitions observed through GET_POPUP_STATE - Ollama unreachable surfaces a user-safe error into popup state - newer request replaces older state (abort semantics) - regenerateLast reuses source text with a fresh requestId - popup-state port receives live broadcasts; wrong port names ignored - fresh-install auto-select persists the first Ollama model - error detail sanitization (URL stripping, length cap, JSON drop) - popup/options smoke tests updated for the two-mode markup - setupRouter resets the shared settings cache for test isolation Docs: README documents the two-mode popup and PDF flow; Testing-Results records automated results and the manual PDF checklist (to be executed). No git-side surprises: this commit was created explicitly on request (requirement 18 of the PDF task had deferred commits until now).
Diffstat (limited to 'doc/Security.md')
-rw-r--r--doc/Security.md32
1 files changed, 29 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/doc/Security.md b/doc/Security.md
index 956f169..66dbde0 100644
--- a/doc/Security.md
+++ b/doc/Security.md
@@ -196,6 +196,7 @@ Use modern APIs where required:
| Extension storage | `storage.local` |
| Long-lived extension communication | `runtime.connect()` / `runtime.Port` |
| One-shot extension messages | `runtime.sendMessage()` |
+| Selection context menu translation | `menus` (selection context only) |
| Dynamic script injection, only if needed | `scripting.executeScript()` |
### 5.4 APIs / Patterns to Avoid
@@ -234,6 +235,7 @@ Expected initial permission set:
```text
storage
+menus
```
Expected host permission:
@@ -249,6 +251,8 @@ or the minimum equivalent required by the final Ollama-host design.
Page access MAY require content-script match patterns for HTTP/HTTPS pages because translation is initiated by selecting page text.
+The `menus` permission is used exclusively for the selection-context translation entry point (context menu "選択したテキストを翻訳"). It MUST NOT be used for any other purpose (no page action items, no tab items, no bookmark items, no launcher items).
+
Do not add broad privileged permissions for convenience.
Every newly introduced permission MUST be justified in code review.
@@ -260,11 +264,11 @@ Every newly introduced permission MUST be justified in code review.
The system has three primary trust zones.
```text
-Untrusted Web Page
+Untrusted Web Page / PDF Viewer selection
|
- | selected text
+ | selected text (content script or menus.selectionText)
v
-Content Script
+Content Script / menu-controller (background)
|
| validated extension messages
v
@@ -324,6 +328,25 @@ The background component owns privileged application operations:
- request cancellation;
- Ollama response parsing.
+### 7.4 Firefox PDF Viewer and Context Menu Input
+
+Firefox's built-in PDF Viewer is privileged browser UI:
+
+- The extension MUST NOT attempt to inject content scripts into it.
+- The extension MUST NOT access its internal DOM, PDF.js internal objects,
+ `wrappedJSObject`, `cloneInto`, `exportFunction`, or any Firefox-internal
+ URI/API to work around the injection restriction.
+- PDF translation is provided exclusively through the public `menus` API.
+
+`menus.OnClickData.selectionText` is UNTRUSTED input:
+
+- it MUST pass the same validation pipeline as content-script selections
+ (string type check, trim, empty rejection, maximum length, control
+ character handling) before being sent to Ollama;
+- it MUST NOT be treated as trusted control input or rendered as HTML;
+- the translation result MUST be rendered in the Action Popup with
+ `textContent`-style plain-text rendering only.
+
---
## 8. DOM and XSS Rules
@@ -743,6 +766,9 @@ Before declaring implementation complete, verify all of the following.
- [ ] No deprecated WebExtensions API used when a supported current alternative exists.
- [ ] Permissions are minimal.
- [ ] No unnecessary `tabs`, `scripting`, `webRequest`, `cookies`, or `nativeMessaging` permission.
+- [ ] `menus` permission used only for selection-context translation.
+- [ ] No content-script injection or internal DOM access into the Firefox PDF Viewer.
+- [ ] `menus.OnClickData.selectionText` validated before use.
- [ ] Firefox behavior manually verified in `about:debugging`.
### DOM / Page Boundary